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RECOVERY OF EPA OVERSIGHT COSTS FROM A BROAD 
READING OF CERCLA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Located near the state border in the Ramapo Mountains is the 
Borough of Ringwood, New Jersey.i This beautiful region of New 
Jersey-which has numerous lakes, parks, and nature trails-is the 
ancestral home of the Ramapough Indians. 2 Unfortunately for the 
Ramapough tribe members, it is also home to a site that was recently 
relisted under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act3 (CERCLA or Superfund) for 
priority cleanup because of the presence of hazardous substances 
which were being released into the environment, and which may be 
linked to increased occurrences of neurological disorders, heart 
disease, diabetes, and other health problems.4 The Ford Motor 
Company used the Ringwood Mines/Landfill Site to dispose of paint 
sludge from a nearby plant that assembled Ford Mavericks, Falcons, 
and other vehicles from 1967 until 1974.5 Ford deposited this sludge 
into mine shafts as well as open pits in a 500-acre area that is part of 
the Superfund site. 6 Nearby residents claim that Ford used countless 
dump trucks to deposit this lava-like sludge into holes on the site, and 
that there was even an instance of a bulldozer falling into one of the 
holes (that Ford never recovered). 7 Among the contaminants in this 
sludge were benzene and other known carcinogens, placing residents, 
as well as visitors who came to enjoy the beauty of the area, in peril. 8 
Because of the risk presented by the hazardous substances at the 
site, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed the site on 
1. Tina Kelley, Toxic Waste Taints a Jewel of New Jersey's Parks System, N.Y. TiMES, 
Jan. 1,2005, at B5; Ron Stodghill, Can Ford Clean Up After Itself!, N.Y. TiMES, July 
29,2007, at BI. 
2. Steve Strunsky, Superfund Site is Relisted, and Inquiry Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. IS, 
2006, at 06. 
3. 42 V.S.c. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
4. Jan Barry et aI., Report Hits EPA Probe of Ford Site, THE RECORD (Bergen County, 
N.J.), Sept. 28, 2007, at AI. 
5. Barry, supra note 4; Strunsky, supra note 2. 
6. Strunsky, supra note 2. 
7. Barbara Williams, Ford Sludge is Found in Ringwood Mine Pit, THE RECORD (Bergen 
County, N.J.), Aug. 10,2006, at AI. 
8. Strunsky, supra note 2. 
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the CERCLA National Priorities List in 1983, and Ford began a 
cleanup of the site in 1987.9 By the end of the cleanup in 1988, Ford 
had removed 11,340 tons of paint sludge and contaminated soil from 
the site.1O In addition, Ford removed another six hundred cubic yards 
of contaminated soil and fifty-four drums from the site in the years 
following this initial cleanup. II Following what the EPA determined 
to be a successful cleanup of the site, the EPA removed the 
Ringwood Mines/Landfill Site from the CERCLA National Priorities 
List in 1994. 12 
In 2003, residents of Ringwood began calling attention to the 
discovery of more paint sludge in areas near the site. 13 Beginning in 
2004, Ford resumed a cleanup effort of the site and ultimately 
removed more than 24,000 additional tons of paint sludge and 
contaminated soil. 14 The rediscovered paint sludge, as well as public 
outcry, forced the EPA to place the site back on the CERCLA 
National Priorities List in 2006. 15 
Because of the mishandling of the site, three members of Congress 
requested an investigation to determine why the EPA delisted the site 
despite considerable amounts of leftover waste still present at the site 
after Ford's initial cleanup efforts. 16 Taking into consideration that 
over two decades had passed since the EPA placed the site on the 
CERCLA National Priorities List, Congressman Frank Pallone Jr. (D-
NJ) stated: "Since Ford is footing the bill, it's inconceivable to me 
why EPA does not expedite the cleanup.,,17 The Office of Inspector 
General, an oversight agency within the EPA, eventually conducted a 
$544,000 investigation of the cleanup activities at the site and issued 
a report detailing many actions that the EPA could have taken to 
better manage the cleanup of the site. 18 Reflecting on the report, 
United States Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) chastised the EPA 
for failing to protect persons residing near the site and asserted that 
"[i]f [the] EPA had done its job, this site would've been cleaned up 






15. See id. 
16. !d. 
17. Press Release, Congressman Frank Pallone Jr., Pallone Demands EPA & Ford Motor 
Co. Finish Cleanup of Ringwood Superfund Site (Sept. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.house.gov/list/press/nj06_pallone/pr_sep27_ringwood.html. 
18. Barry, supra note 4. 
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long ago." 19 The report noted that the EPA required very little 
documentation from Ford of its cleanup activities at the site and 
poorly gathered information regarding the scope of the contamination 
of the site. 20 
While this situation might be a mere embarrassment to the EPA, it 
is a tragedy for the residents of Ringwood, many of whom are 
minority Native Americans. 21 This fumbling by the EPA has caused 
these residents to distrust the EPA and to question its ability to 
properly oversee a private party performing a CERCLA cleanup 
action. 22 The end result of over two decades of EPA oversight of 
Ford's cleanup activities at the site has been very little reduction in 
the perceived risks from the site for the residents of Ringwood, 
despite enormous EPA and Ford expenditures. 
But when the EPA decides to oversee a private-party cleanup under 
CERCLA, who is responsible for paying for the costs of the EPA's 
oversight activities? The nearby residents? The EPA? The polluter? 
That is the question this comment addresses. Specifically, this 
comment analyzes situations where the EPA, acting pursuant to 
CERCLA, oversees a private-party action to clean up a particular 
facility or site that is contaminated with hazardous substances and 
analyzes whether CERCLA authorizes the federal government to 
recover the EPA's oversight expenses from the private party. 
This comment concludes, after a thorough analysis of CERCLA, 
that the EPA is not permitted to recover those costs from the private 
party performing a CERCLA cleanup of a contaminated site. Not 
only does the language of CERCLA demand that conclusion,23 but 
this conclusion is also supported by public policy considerations 
underlying CERCLA. 24 The best way to ensure that the EPA acts not 
only efficiently, but also effectively, is to require the federal 
government to pay the costs of the EPA's own expenses incurred in 
supervising a private-party cleanup under CERCLA. Of course all of 
these costs incurred by the EPA will be paid by federal taxpayers, but 
those taxpayers are in the best position to hold the EPA accountable 
for inefficient oversight of private-party cleanup activities under 
CERCLA. The tax-paying citizens of the United States, through their 
elected representatives and senators in the United States Congress, 
19. !d. 
20. [d. 
21. Strunsky, supra note 2. 
22. Williams, supra note 7. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. See Barry, supra note 4. 
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have the power to reward satisfactory perfonnance by the EPA or to 
penalize the EPA for a misstep such as Ringwood. 25 This method is 
the best way to ensure that the EPA supervises private-party 
CERCLA cleanups diligently and promotes a quick and successful 
cleanup response to help those persons suffering as a result of 
hazardous substance releases at a contaminated site. 
This comment will address whether the EPA, under CERCLA, can 
recover expenses incurred when overseeing a private-party cleanup 
action pursuant to an administrative order or consent agreement 
under CERCLA, not only by examining public policy concerns, but 
also by reading the language of the Act. Despite the heavy focus on 
public policy in the preceding paragraph, this comment will primarily 
address the issue through an analysis ofCERCLA's many provisions. 
In Part II, this comment provides an overview of CERCLA's overall 
framework as well as CERCLA's provisions governing private-party 
cleanups of contaminated facilities and sites.26 Part III provides the 
interpretations by various federal appellate courts of these relevant 
provisions of CERCLA,27 while Part IV discusses those judicial 
interpretations of CERCLA and concludes that the courts have 
improperly interpreted the language of the CERCLA statute and 
reached conclusions that are not supported by the statute's plain 
language. 28 
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
In response to sites such as Love Canal and numerous other 
contaminated sites,29 the 96th Congress enacted CERCLA on 
December 11, 1980. 30 The final version of the Act was a last-minute 
compromise, constructed in order to enable the Act to be enacted. 31 
As a result, there is very little legislative history available that might 
be used to detennine Congress's original intent as to the 
interpretation of the language in the enacted statute's various 
25. See 42 U.S.c. § 9662 (2006) (stating that Congress directly controls the government 
liability under CERCLA, limiting government liability "only to such extent or in such 
amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts."); see also 2 U.S.c. § 621 (2006). 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part III. 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. Rudy Abramson, The Superfund Cleanup: Mired in Its Own Mess, L.A. TIMES, May 
10,1993, at AI. 
30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(2006)). 
31. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
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provisions. 32 Despite the lack of legislative history, the courts have 
found that it is clear that Congress enacted CERCLA to achieve two 
goals: (l) to provide the federal government with the tools necessary 
to effectuate a prompt response to releases or threatened releases of 
hazardous substances at a particular facility or site and (2) to ensure 
that those persons responsible for the contamination of the facility or 
site (referred to as potentially responsible parties or PRPs) bear the 
cost of the cleanup. 33 Achievement of these two goals presents 
numerous problems as the cleanup of a particular contaminated 
facility or site can take years to complete, costing millions of dollars, 
and the potential list of responsible parties can number over one 
thousand for some contaminated facilities or sites. 34 
As originally enacted in 1980, CERCLA contained many defects 
and omissions that impaired the ability of the federal government to 
implement a prompt and effective cleanup response at a particular 
contaminated facility or site. 35 As a result of these inadequacies, 
Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA).36 SARA included provisions requiring the 
EP A to complete the cleanup action at a number of specified sites 
within a specified time schedule and also limited a private party's 
ability to delay the cleanup process. 37 In addition to these changes, 
there were additional amendments that concerned the definition of 
terms that are relevant to this comment and will be discussed later. 38 
Before delving into interpretation of the actual language of the 
CERCLA statute, it is helpful to present an overview of the typical 
manner in which a CERCLA cleanup action will proceed. Initially, 
there has to be some sort of environmental contamination at the 
facility or site in question, which results in the EPA placing the 
32. See id. 
33. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
34. See Martin A. McCrory, Who's on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and 
Protection, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 3, 4, 6 (1999). 
35. See Scott C. Whitney, Superfund Reform: Clarification of Cleanup Standards to 
Rationalize the Remedy Selection Process, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 183, 188 (1995). 
36. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 
Stat. 1613. 
37. Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the 
Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1052 
(1994). To limit the ability of a responsible party to delay the cleanup process, SARA 
restricted the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review and imposed a time 
schedule on settlement negotiations. Id. 
38. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
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particular site on the National Priorities List. 39 Following this action, 
the EPA and those parties found to be responsible for the 
contamination of the facility or site will either enter into an 
agreement or the EP A will issue an order directing certain 
responsible parties to perform a specified cleanup action.40 To 
supplement the efforts of the private parties performing the cleanup 
action, the EPA will also expend considerable resources in order to 
oversee the private-party cleanup. 41 
A. Responsible Parties 
To begin an analysis of CERCLA, it is necessary to detail which 
parties CERCLA identifies as being potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs) and subject to liability for governmental and private-party 
costs of cleaning up a particular contaminated facility or site. 
CERCLA section 107 identifies four categories of PRPs: (1) the 
owner or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or operator of the 
facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance at the 
facility; (3) any person who arranged for the disposal or treatment, by 
another person or entity, of any hazardous substance owned or 
possessed by that person, at the facility (if the facility is owned or 
operated by another party or entity); and (4) any person who accepts 
any hazardous substance for transport to the facility (if the transporter 
selected that facility).42 The breadth of these four categories of PRPs 
indicates Congress's intent to make responsible, and liable, those 
parties who had any significant involvement in facilitating the 
disposal of a hazardous substance at a contaminated facility or site. 
Once a person is identified as a CERCLA PRP, there are very few 
affirmative defenses available to that person. These defenses, also 
included in CERCLA section 107, are limited, and rarely 
applicable. 43 These defenses apply only in situations where the 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the 
39. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 163 (3d Cir. 
2005); At!. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 566 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
Alternatively, the EPA can propose to add the site to the National Priorities List to 
secure compliance with its mandated cleanup plan. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1268 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by Dupont, 432 F.3d 161. 
Congress authorized the creation of the National Priorities List under CERCLA 
section lOS. CERCLA § 105,42 U.S.c. § 9605(a)(8)(8) (2006). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1997). 
41. See, e.g., Dupont, 432 F.3d at 163 (holding certain private parties responsible for 
$1,394,796.94 of EP A oversight costs). 
42. CERCLA § J07(a)(J)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (2006) 
43. See id. § J07(b), § 9607(b). 
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contaminated site was caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act 
of war; or (3) "an act or omission of a third party[,] other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant" or a person whose act or 
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship with 
the defendant, where the defendant shows that: 
(a) [the defendant] exercised due care with respect to the 
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration 
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of 
all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) [the defendant] 
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of 
any such third party and the consequences that could 
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions. 44 
These defenses are narrowly defined and must be the sole reason 
for the contamination. 45 The limited nature of these defenses 
expresses Congress's intent to ensure that those persons responsible 
for the contamination will be subject to CERCLA liability. 
B. Authorization to Perform a Cleanup 
Prior to undertaking a cleanup of a contaminated facility or site that 
is likely to result in cleanup expenses of millions of dollars, it is 
important to conduct a preliminary assessment of the facility or site, 
as authorized in CERCLA section 104.46 A Remedial Investigation 
and Feasibility Study (RIfFS) is the first step in such a preliminary 
assessment. 47 An RIIFS is an evaluation of the site conducted to 
remove uncertainty about the scope and condition of the 
contamination at the facility or site. 48 The information gathered from 
the RIIFS will be used by the party performing the cleanup, either the 
EP A, a state, or a private party, to select the remedy best suited for 
the site. 49 The relevant part of CERCLA section 104 provides: 
44. Id. 
45. See id. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
hazardous substance release or threatened release resulted "solely" from one of the 
three specified types of acts or omissions, or that the release or threatened release was 
caused solely by a combination of the three specified types of acts or omissions. Id. 
46. CERCLA § 104(a)(I), 42 U.S.c. § 9604(a)(I) (2006). 
47. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-540-G89004, GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING REMEDIAL 
INVESTIGATIONS AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES UNDER CERCLA 1-6 (1988), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfundlpolicy/remedy/pdfs/540g-89004-s.pdf. 
48. Id. at \-3. 
49. Id. 
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When the President determines that such action will be done 
properly and promptly by [any PRP], the President may 
allow such person to carry out the action, conduct the 
remedial investigation, or conduct the feasibility study in 
accordance with [section 122]. No remedial investigation or 
feasibility study (RIIFS) shall be authorized except on a 
determination by the President that the party is qualified to 
conduct the RIlFS and only if the President contracts with or 
arranges for a qualified person to assist the President in 
overseeing and reviewing the conduct of such RIIFS and if 
the responsible party agrees to reimburse the Fund for any 
cost incurred by the President under, or in connection with, 
the oversight contract or arrangement. 50 
Important portions of this section dictate that an RIIFS may be 
conducted by a PRP only after the EPA has determined that the PRP 
will properly carry out the RIfFS. 51 Additionally, the EPA may only 
permit a private party to perform an RIfFS if the private party 
arranges for oversight of the RIIFS by a qualified person and agrees 
to pay for the costs of that oversight. 52 
Addressing an issue that is not directly the subject of this comment 
but that is important to a discussion of CERCLA, CERCLA section 
104 also authorizes the federal government to initiate a cleanup 
action at a contaminated facility or site and then seek restitution of its 
cleanup costs from the responsible parties. 53 Pursuant to CERCLA 
section 104, the EPA may perform a cleanup action at a contaminated 
facility or site when 
any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial 
threat of such a release into the environment, or ... there is 
a release or substantial threat of release into the 
environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may 
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare .... 54 
In carrying out a cleanup action in such a situation under CERCLA 
section 104, the measures undertaken must be consistent with the 
50. 42 u.s.c. § 9604(a)(l). The President has delegated his authority under this 
provision to the EPA. Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987). 




2010J Recovery of EPA Oversight Costs 333 
National Contingency Plan (NCP).55 The NCP, authorized by 
CERCLA section 105, details the "procedures and standards for 
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants. ,,56 
The alternative to a government-led cleanup action under CERCLA 
section 104 is a private-party cleanup action. For this type of cleanup 
to occur under CERCLA, the EPA will either issue an administrative 
order pursuant to CERCLA section 106, mandating such action, or 
enter into a consent agreement, pursuant to section 122, that requires 
such action. 57 In order for the EPA to permit a private-party cleanup 
under CERCLA, the EPA must first determine that the private party 
will properly perform the cleanup. 58 To facilitate the execution of the 
private-party cleanup action, the EPA will develop a cleanup plan for 
the private party. 59 Congress authorized the EPA to enter into such 
consent agreements in order to expedite the cleanup process, as well 
as to avoid unnecessary litigation. 60 
C. Right of the Government and CERCLA PRPs to Recover Their 
Cleanup Costs or Contribution from other PRPs 
The cost recovery provisions of CERCLA are sections 107 and 
113(f). After dictating which groups are PRPs, CERCLA section 107 
outlines four categories of costs that are recoverable: 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the 
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not 
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any 
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other 
person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) 
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and 
55. Id. 
56. CERCLA § 105,42 U.S.c. § 9605 (2006). 
57. CERCLA §§ I06(a), 122,42 U.S.c. §§ 9606(a), 9622 (2006); see also United States 
v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2005). 
58. 42 U.S.c. § 9622(a). 
59. Id. §§ 9604(c)(4), 9621(a); see also Dupont, 432 F.3d at 165. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) ("[T]he President shall act to facilitate agreements under this 
section that are in the public interest and consistent with the National Contingency 
Plan in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation."). 
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(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects 
study carried out under [section 104(i)].61 
As indicated by CERCLA section 107, the first category of costs 
includes the federal government's costs of "removal" and 
"remediation" actions. 62 As this comment will demonstrate, these 
two terms are vital to a discussion of whether the EPA can recover its 
oversight costs because courts place heavy emphasis on the 
definitions of CERCLA's terms. 63 To recover this first category of 
costs, the federal government is only required to show that these costs 
are "not inconsistent" with the NCP, a less demanding test than for 
the second category. 64 The second category permits recovery by a 
private person of removal or remediation costs, but these costs must 
be consistent with the NCp.65 The third and fourth categories, while 
important, do not implicate the issue this comment addresses; 
therefore, this comment will not discuss them further. 
In addition to CERCLA section 107, the other cost recovery 
provision in CERCLA is the contribution provision in section 113(f), 
which is limited to private parties. 66 A private-party PRP acquires 
this right to contribution only after the federal or state government or 
a private party has sought recovery from the private-party PRP under 
CERCLA section 107, or the private party has been subject to an 
EPA administrative order under section 106. 67 A private-party PRP 
may recover from any other PRP any costs that fit within one of the 
four categories of costs in CERCLA section 107.68 In addition to 
providing a right to contribution for those PRPs that have performed 
a cleanup action, this section also shields parties from liability for 
contribution if the party has settled with the government. 69 
61. !d. § 9607(a)(4). 
62. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
63. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 569 (10th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1275 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by 
United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
64. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). A private-party PRP defendant, in order to avoid 
liability under this subsection of section 107 of CERCLA, is required to prove that the 
government's cleanup actions were inconsistent with the NCP when the government 
undertook a cleanup pursuant to CERCLA section 104. See, e.g., At!. Richfield Co., 
98 F.3d at 569. 
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(25), 9607(a)(4)(B). CERCLA section 101 defines "response" 
costs to include costs for "removal" or "remediation." Id. § 9601(25). 
66. See CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2006). 
67. See id. 
68. !d. 
69. Id. § 9613(f)(2). 
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D. Removal, Remediation, and Response Costs 
Having described the four main categories of costs a PRP may be 
responsible for paying under CERCLA, the next step is a further 
inquiry into exactly what costs are included within these categories. 
While it might seem counterintuitive, the starting point for a further 
interpretation of these categories will actually begin in the second 
category. The reason for this becomes apparent when examining the 
phrase "necessary costs of response," which can be recovered under 
section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA by a private party (other than the 
federal government, a state, or an Indian tribe). 70 CERCLA defines 
response to mean "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all 
such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') 
include enforcement activities related thereto. ,,71 As is apparent, any 
"necessary costs of response" include removal and remediation 
actions, and that leads the analysis back to the first phrase. 
The first phrase, "all costs of removal or remediation action 
incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian 
tribe,,,n requires defining the terms removal and remediation. A 
removal action is generally considered to be a short-term response, 
while a remediation action tends to be a long-term response or 
permanent solution. 73 A more exact definition of these two terms can 
be found in CERCLA section 101.74 The first term, removal, is 
defined by CERCLA as follows: 
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances 
from the environment, such actions as may be necessary 
taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous 
substances into the environment, such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or 
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of 
removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may 
be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to 
70. ld. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
71. 42 U.S.c. § 9601(25) (2006). Unfortunately, CERCLA does not further define the 
term "enforcement activities," which is a term courts have examined in their analysis 
of this comment's issue. See discussion infra Part III. 
72. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
73. United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1997). 
74. This comment uses the term "more exact" because, as will be shown later in the 
comment, almost every court struggles to determine exactly what Congress intended. 
See discussion infra Part III. 
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the public health or welfare or to the environment, which 
may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. 75 
The second term, remediation, is defined as follows: 
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken 
instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into 
the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of 
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause 
substantial danger to present or future public health or 
welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not 
limited to, such actions at the location of the release as 
storage, confinement, ... and any monitoring reasonably 
required to assure that such actions protect the public health 
and welfare and the environment. 76 
This concludes this comment's discussion of the relevant 
provisions of CERCLA. Next, it is important to see how courts have 
analyzed these CERCLA sections and terms used in CERCLA and 
how the case law has developed within the Circuits. 
III. RELEV ANT CASES 
In order to fully understand how the case law involving this 
comment's issue has evolved, it is necessary to begin with a court 
decision that almost every other court addressing the issue has 
considered. Following this discussion, this comment will analyze, 
chronologically, each of the relevant cases, irrespective of 
jurisdiction, as each court has been influenced by other jurisdictions' 
opinions even though they are not binding. This comment will show 
the development of case law among jurisdictions with respect to this 
comment's issue and the relevant provisions of CERCLA. 
A. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co. (1993) 
In United States v. Rohm & Haas CO.,77 one of the first cases to 
address the issue of whether the EPA can recover costs incurred in 
75. CERCLA § 101(23),42 U.S.c. § 9601(23) (2006). 
76. Id. § 101(23), § 9601(24). The list within the definition of "remediation," shortened 
by an ellipsis, includes activities that one might reasonably assume would occur at a 
contaminated site, but it is quite exhaustive and detracts from the parts of the 
definition pertinent to the issue this comment seeks to address. 
77. 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by United States v. E.!. Dupont De Nemours & 
Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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oversight of a private-party cleanup action,78 from 1917 until 1975 
the defendants owned a 120-acre landfill located next to the Delaware 
River in Bristol Township, Pennsylvania. 79 During this time, the 
defendants Rohm & Haas (R&H), used this landfill to dispose of 
refuse and wastes from R&H's plastics and chemical manufacturing 
plants.8o Following an administrative order by the EPA under section 
106 of CERCLA, R&H began to conduct a removal action at the site 
in 1989.81 Subsequently, R&H began performing the required work 
with the EPA overseeing the progress. 82 In November 1990, the 
United States brought a cost recovery action pursuant to CERCLA 
section 107, seeking reimbursement of all costs incurred by the 
federal government in connection with the site since 1979.83 The 
district court, finding in favor of the government, awarded the United 
States $401,348.78 and all future costs properly incurred under 
CERCLA. 84 These costs included not only direct costs, but also 
indirect costs such as travel, payroll, and hiring contractors to review 
the work completed by R&H. 85 
The issue before the court in Rohm & Haas, like the issue this 
comment addresses, was whether the EPA can recover its expenses, 
under section 107 of CERCLA, for the oversight of a private-party 
removal action. 86 Unlike some of the cases that will be discussed 
later, Rohm & Haas only considered whether a removal action 
included oversight, and did not analyze terms such as remediation or 
response costS.87 To analyze the relevant provisions of CERCLA, the 
78. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564,568 (1996) (noting that the only 
relevant pre-Rohm & Haas decision is New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
79. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1268. 
80. !d. 
81. /d. R&H entered into this administrative consent order under a similar environmental 
act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k. Id. The court found that costs incurred under the RCRA could nonetheless be 
recoverable under CERCLA, provided that the costs met the definition of "removal." 
Id. at 1274-75. 
82. Id. at 1268. 
83. Id. 
84. /d. at 1269. 
85. !d. at 1269 n.4. 
86. !d. at 1269. 
87. Id. at 1271. The opinion states that the parties agreed that if the government's 
oversight costs could be recovered, it would only be recoverable under the definition 
of removal. Id. It does not state whether this is because the cleanup action involved 
was only a short-term response or whether the parties believed nothing in the 
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Third Circuit began by determining which standard of statutory 
interpretation to apply. 88 R&H argued for a standard whereby the 
court would have to find clear congressional intent within CERCLA 
for the EPA to recover the costs of its oversight. 89 In support of its 
position, R&H relied on National Cable Television Ass 'n v. United 
States,90 a case later interpreted by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. 
Mid-America Pipeline Co}' as standing for the proposition that 
"Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the 
Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs 
not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing 
additional financial burdens, whether characterized as 'fees' or 
'taxes,' on those parties.,,92 For reasons that will be discussed below, 
the Third Circuit agreed with R&H and concluded that the definition 
of removal must unambiguously provide for recovery of EPA 
oversight costS.93 
Before continuing with a discussion of why the Third Circuit 
decided to apply the standard enunciated in National Cable, it is 
helpful to provide a summary of the issues in National Cable. 
National Cable involved the Independent Offices Appropriation Act 
of 1952. 94 At issue was whether the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) could base the fees it charged community 
antenna television (CATV) providers on the basis of direct and 
indirect costs to the government agency alone. 95 The Independent 
Offices Appropriation Act of 1952 provided that 
it is the sense of the Congress that any work, service ... 
benefit, . . . license,. . . or similar thing of value or utility 
performed, furnished, provided, granted ... by any Federal 
agency. .. to or for any person (including ... 
corporations ... ) . .. shall be self-sustaining to the full 
extent possible, and the head of each Federal agency is 
authorized by regulation ... to prescribe therefore ... such 
fee, charge, or price, if any, as he shall determine ... to be 
definitions of other terms such as remediation or response permitted the government 
to recover its oversight costs. Jd. 
88. Jd. at 1273. 
89. Jd. 
90. 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
91. 490 U.S. 212 (1989). 
92. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Skinner, 490 U.S. at 224). 
93. Jd. at 1274. 
94. Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, ch. 376, 65 Stat. 268 (1951 ) (codified 
as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (2006)). 
95. Nat 'I Cable, 415 U.S. at 337-40. 
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fair and equitable taking into consideration direct and 
indirect cost to the Government, value to the recipient, 
public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts. 96 
339 
The FCC had determined its direct and indirect costs for CATV 
regulation to be $1,145,400 annually.97 Based upon this calculation, 
the FCC added a thirty-cent-per-subscriber annual fee to each CATV 
system. 98 This fee would produce $1,145,000 annually, and the FCC 
concluded that it would approximate the "value to the recipient" as it 
is used within the Act. 99 
Looking at the language of the Act, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Act authorizes the FCC to impose a "fee," which connotes a 
"benefit" of value to the recipient. 100 A fee is incident to a voluntary 
act where the regulated entity receives a benefit not normally 
received by members of the public. \01 The Court concluded that 
"value to the recipient" was the true measure of the fee permitted, 
whereas the later language in the Act, "public policy or interest 
served," would permit the FCC to seek revenue that would amount to 
levying a tax. \02 This result would be contrary to the Act's objectives 
as it would obligate the regulated entities to pay for not only the 
benefits they received, but also for the protective services the FCC 
provides to the public. \03 The Court concluded that the Act did not 
permit the FCC to calculate its total direct and indirect costs for the 
regulation of CATV "and then to contrive a formula that reimburses 
the Commission for that amount." \04 Because some of the total direct 
and indirect costs for regulation "inured to the benefit of the public," 
the Court held that the FCC must recalculate the fees it charged. 105 
Turning back to Rohm & Haas, the Third Circuit found the 
rationale in National Cable and the later interpretation in Skinner 
96. [d. at 337 (quoting 31 V.S.c. § 483a (1970) (current version at 31 V.S.c. § 9701 
(2006)). The current version of the statute no longer includes an explicit reference to 
an agency's indirect costs. 31 U.S.c. § 9701 (2006). It now just states that the fees 
must be based on "the costs to the [g]overnment," as opposed to direct and indirect 
costs to the government. [d. 
97. Nat 'I Cable, 415 V.S. at 340. 
98. !d. 
99. [d. 
100. !d. at 340-41. 
101. Id. 
102. [d. at 341-43. 
103. !d. at 341. 
104. !d. at 343. 
105. [d. at 343-44. 
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applicable to the case. 106 The court detennined that the EPA 
oversight costs were the type of "administrative costs not inuring 
directly to the benefit of regulated parties" discussed in National 
Cable. 107 The Third Circuit noted that the oversight costs were 
intended for the benefit of the public rather than the interests of those 
the EPA supervised. 108 While the government contended that 
National Cable involved different circumstances, the court found that 
the rationale in National Cable and the statement in Skinner were not 
"confined to that narrow set of circumstances." 109 The Third Circuit 
concluded that "[it would] not presume Congress to have intended a 
statute to create the dramatic and unusual effect of requiring 
regulated parties to pay a large share of the administrative costs 
incurred by the overseeing agency unless the statutory language 
clearly and explicitly requires that result." I 10 
Applying the clear statement doctrine, the Third Circuit then 
considered whether the definition of removal contained the 
authorization for the recovery of EPA oversight costs. The Third 
Circuit began by noting that nowhere in the definition of removal was 
there any mention of the type of oversight costs the EPA sought to 
recover. III Despite this, the government contended that the 
authorization for recovery could be found within the phrase "such 
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the 
release or threat of release of hazardous substances" in the definition 
of removal. 112 The Third Circuit noted that this phrase, specifically 
the term "monitor," might be understood to encompass some 
oversight of a private-party action when viewed in a vacuum. 113 But 
the court held that the language must be examined in the context of a 
traditional CERCLA response, and therefore found that Congress 
more likely intended the tenn "monitor" to encompass actual 
monitoring of the release or threat of release, and not the oversight of 
a private party perfonning the removal action. 114 Accordingly, the 
Third Circuit found that CERCLA lacked the clear statement required 
by National Cable and held that the federal government could not 
106. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled 
by United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
107. Id. at 1273 (quoting Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989)). 
108. Id. 
109. !d. at 1273-74. 
110. Id. at 1274. 
Ill. Id.atl275. 
112. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2006)). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1275-76. 
2010] Recovery of EPA Oversight Costs 341 
recover, under section 107 of CERCLA, the costs of EPA 
oversight. 115 
B. The Other Circuits Respond to Rohm & Haas: Atlantic Richfield 
Co. v. American Airlines (1996) and United States v. Lowe 
(1997) 
The next circuit court decision to address the issue of EPA 
oversight under CERCLA was the Tenth Circuit's decision in 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc. 116 This case is 
different from the other cases discussed in this comment because 
Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) brought the cost-recovery 
action against other pRPS.ll7 ARCO brought this action after it 
negotiated a consent decree with the EPA whereby ARCa would 
implement the entire remedy subject to the oversight of the EPA. 118 
After ARCa cleaned the site to the satisfaction of the EPA in 1993, 
ARCa sought contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA section 
113(f).119 As discussed previously, the analysis is essentially the 
same for this type of action as it is for an action brought by the 
government because CERCLA section 113(f), the provision 
providing a right to contribution, allows the private party to recover 
all costs recoverable under section 107. 120 
Another difference between Atlantic and Rohm & Haas is the type 
of cleanup action involved. Whereas Rohm & Haas dealt with a 
removal action, the cleanup perfonned by ARCa in Atlantic was a 
remedial action. 121 Even though Rohm & Haas involved a different 
type of cleanup action, the Tenth Circuit still considered Rohm & 
Haas's reasoning, but nonetheless found it unpersuasive. 122 The 
court asserted that Rohm & Haas "departed significantly from prior 
case law," despite the existence of only one case decided prior to 
Rohm & Haas that addressed whether the EPA could recover 
oversight costs pursuant to CERCLA. 123 The Tenth Circuit 
questioned the use of a clear statement standard to analyze this issue 
and concluded that the circumstances in National Cable were 
115. Id. at 1278. 
116. At!. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F .3d 564 (10th Cir. 1996). 
117. Id. at 566. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 565-66. 
120. 42 U.S.c. § 9613(f) (2006); see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
121. At!. Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 568. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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distinguishable from the issue in Atlantic. 124 Moreover, the court 
stated that National Cable involved members of a regulated industry, 
whereas Atlantic involves responsible parties paying for restitution. 125 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that it did not need to determine 
National Cable's applicability to Atlantic as it was used within Rohm 
& Haas because the cases involved two different types of response 
actions. 126 
Turning to the definition of remediation, the Tenth Circuit focused 
on the phrase within that definition referring to "any monitoring 
reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public 
health and welfare and the environment.,,127 The court correctly 
noted that "monitor" is not defined within CERCLA and chose to 
rely on a thesaurus to obtain a list of synonyms for the word, which 
included "audit, check, control, inspect, investigate, observe, oversee, 
regulate, review, scrutinize, study, survey, test and watch.,,128 The 
Tenth Circuit then continued its examination of remediation, using 
the words monitoring and oversight interchangeably.129 Interestingly, 
in an earlier part of the decision, the court had distinguished the 
circumstances in National Cable from this case on the grounds that 
National Cable involved "regulated" entities. 130 It seems 
questionable for the Tenth Circuit to rely on a group of synonyms so 
broad that it included the word "regulate," an action the court felt so 
distinguishable that it could disregard precedent established by the 
Supreme Court. 131 Notwithstanding the apparent inconsistency, the 
court ultimately concluded that EPA oversight costs were recoverable 
under section 107 of CERCLA under the definition of remediation 
because it was "reasonably required to assure that private party 
remedial actions protect the public health and welfare and the 
environment." 132 
The next court of appeals to examine the issue addressed in this 
comment was the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Lowe. 133 Unlike 
the two previous cases, the response action in this case included not 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. The Tenth Circuit asserted that it could find the authorization for the recovery of 
EPA oversight within the definition of "removal" even under the clear statement 
standard, but did not detail its reasoning. Id. at 569. 
127. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2006». 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 569-70. 
130. Id. at 568-69. 
131. See id. at 569. 
132. Id. at 570. 
133. 118 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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only a removal action, but also a remediation action. 134 The EPA 
ordered this private-party response action pursuant to CERCLA 
section 106 and the private parties performed the cleanup to the 
EPA's satisfaction by 1993.135 In 1991, the government filed a cost-
recovery action against the private parties under CERCLA section 
107 to recover its expenses, including oversight costS.136 The 
defendants urged the court to apply the clear statement standard of 
National Cable, and follow the Third Circuit in Rohm & Haas. 13? 
The federal government, on the other hand, asserted that National 
Cable was inappropriate for the court's consideration of the issue as 
it involved the imposition of fees on regulated entities, while 
CERCLA is a remedial statute. 138 The Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed 
with the government and distinguished the circumstances from those 
in National Cable. 139 
Turning next to the Fifth Circuit's analysis of whether the EPA can 
recover its oversight expenses of a private-party cleanup action, this 
comment will focus on the part of the opinion discussing response 
costs. While the Fifth Circuit did consider the definitions of both 
removal and remediation, the court devoted a considerable amount of 
its decision to the definition of response costs. 140 As discussed in 
Part ILD, response costs is not only an umbrella term for other terms 
such as removal and remediation; it also includes "enforcement 
activities" related to such costs. 141 The Fifth Circuit in Lowe found 
that EPA oversight easily fit within the definition of enforcement 
activities. 142 The court stated that EPA "monitoring or oversight is an 
inherent and necessary enforcement element of private party response 
action." 143 The Fifth Circuit concluded that enforcement activities 




138. Id. at 401. 
139. Id. 
140. See id. at 401-04. The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the terms "removal" and 
"remediation" were much the same as the Tenth Circuit's examination of 
"remediation" in Atlantic. See id. at 401-03. The Fifth Circuit also focused much of 
its attention on the term, "monitoring," and cited the synonyms used in Atlantic to 
come up with a list of possible meanings for monitoring. Id. at 403. 
141. 42 U.S.c. § 9601(25) (2006); see supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
142. Lowe, 118 F.3d at 403. 
143. Id. The Fifth Circuit here, like the Tenth Circuit in Atlantic, was comfortable using 
one synonym from the assorted list of synonyms interchangeably with the actual 
language of CERCLA. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text. 
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include EP A oversight because certain sections of CERCLA, 
specifically CERCLA sections 111(c)(8), 122(t)(3), and 122(t)(5), 
contemplate EPA oversight. 144 As a result of the court's analysis of 
the definitions of removal, remediation, and response costs, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the plain meaning of CERCLA authorized the EPA 
to recover its costs of oversight of a private-party cleanup action. 145 
C. The Third Circuit Overrules Rohrn & Haas: United States v. E.!. 
Dupont De Nemours & Co. (2005) 
In 2005, the Third Circuit revisited its prior holding in Rohm & 
Haas when it decided the case of United States v. E.I. Dupont De 
Nemours & Co. 146 The Dupont case arose from an administrative 
order the EPA issued pursuant to CERCLA section 106 requiring the 
defendants to clean up the site, subject to EPA oversight. 147 The 
response plan consisted of two stages: a removal stage and a 
remediation stage. 148 In the first stage, the government incurred 
$746,279.77 in oversight costs, and in the second stage, the 
government incurred $648,517.17 in oversight costs; total oversight 
costs were $1,394,796.94. 149 The government then brought a cost-
recovery action against the defendants pursuant to CERCLA section 
107. 150 
Dupont is a notable case because it includes not only a majority 
opinion, but also a dissenting opinion. 151 The majority first 
reexamined whether the Third Circuit would continue to rely upon 
the rationale in National Cable as applicable to the issue before it 
144. Lowe, 118 F.3d at 403. Section 111(c)(8) of CERCLA permits the use of the 
Superfund to pay for the costs of oversight of RIlFS as well as for the costs of 
oversight of remedial activities taken pursuant to consent orders or settlement 
agreements. CERCLA § 111(c)(8), 42 U.S.c. § 9611(c)(8) (2006). Sections 
122(f)(3) and (5) of CERCLA base the validity of a covenant not to sue on 
satisfactory completion of a cleanup action. CERCLA § 122(f)(3), (5), 42 U.S.c. § 
9622(f)(3), (5) (2006). As will be discussed later, the inclusion of these provisions 
actually raises questions as to why Congress did not include an explicit reference to 
EPA oversight costs as the type of costs that are recoverable under CERCLA by the 
federal government. See discussion infra Part IY.BA. 
145. Lowe, 118 F.3d at 404. 
146. 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
147. Id. at 163. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. United States v. E.!. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16366, at 
*1-2 (D. Del. Aug. 5,2004). 
151. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 180 (Rendell, J., dissenting). The case also includes a concurring 
opinion which agrees with the result, but takes issue with the majority's interpretation 
of the term "monitoring." !d. (Roth, J., concurring in part). 
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under CERCLA. 152 The Third Circuit reiterated the reasoning 
asserted by the courts in Atlantic and Lowe in distinguishing the 
circumstances in National Cable from those presented by the case 
before it. 153 The court found that while National Cable involved the 
imposition of user fees on a regulated industry, the issue in Dupont 
concerned a remedial statute that sought restitution from liable 
parties. 154 Also vital to the Third Circuit's reasoning was its assertion 
that CERCLA liability is determined through the courts, not by an 
administrative decision as in National Cable. 155 Applying these 
considerations, the court decided to overrule the precedent of Rohm 
& Haas and concluded that the rationale in National Cable was no 
longer applicable to a discussion of recovery by the federal 
government of EPA oversight costs under CERCLA. 156 
Turning next to the Third Circuit's analysis of the language of 
CERCLA, the court analyzed the CERCLA terms removal, 
remediation, and response costs, in much the same way as did the 
courts in Atlantic and Lowe. Like these two previous decisions, the 
Third Circuit used the same broad list of synonyms to equate the term 
monitoring, used in the definitions of both removal and remediation, 
with EPA oversight. 157 The Third Circuit also examined response 
costs, which include costs of enforcement activities, and determined 
that Congress also intended it to include EPA oversight costS. 158 The 
court believed that enforcement activities include any action taken to 
ensure compliance with CERCLA. 159 
The Third Circuit also addressed a provision not previously 
analyzed in depth in this comment, CERCLA section 104, which 
authorizes a private party to conduct a remedial investigation and 
feasibility study. As discussed in Part II.B, this part of CERCLA 
section 104, amended by SARA, requires the private party to agree in 
advance to reimburse the government for the oversight expenses of 
supervising a private party RIIFS. 160 The defendants asserted that the 
inclusion of this provision in CERCLA by Congress would be 
unnecessary if CERCLA section 107, pursuant to the definitions of 
152. Id. at 166-68. 
153. Id. at 167-68. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 168. 
156. Id. at 162-63, 169. 
157. Id. at 171-72. 
158. Id.atI73-74. 
159. Id. 
160. CERCLA § 104(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (2006). 
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removal, remediation, and response costs, already permitted the 
recovery of EPA oversight costs. 161 The government, on the other 
hand, contended that this provision in CERCLA section 104 is not 
unnecessary because it adds an additional requirement for private 
parties, specifically that they agree in advance to pay for the federal 
government's oversight expenses. 162 The Third Circuit agreed with 
the government's argument and reasoned that Congress added this 
language to CERCLA section 104 in order to further the goal of 
encouraging settlements under CERCLA. 163 The court concluded 
that Congress included this provision in CERCLA section 104 in 
order to avoid forcing the EPA to bring an action under section 107 
to seek reimbursement for these costs after the private party 
conducted the RVFS. '64 
In contrast to the position taken by the majority, the dissent in 
Dupont concluded that if EPA oversight costs were otherwise 
recoverable by the federal government under CERCLA's definitions 
of removal, remediation, or response costs, there would be no need 
under CERCLA to permit recovery by the federal government of 
oversight costs for this specific type of action. 165 The dissent 
concluded that under the majority's interpretation, notwithstanding 
CERCLA section 104, a PRP would effectively agree in advance to 
pay for EP A oversight costs when entering into a settlement 
agreement because the government would be authorized to recover 
these expenses after the cleanup as a matter of law pursuant to section 
107. 166 For the dissent, CERCLA section 104 is more naturally read 
as an exception to CERCLA's general rule that EPA oversight costs 
are not recoverable under section 107 by the federal government. 167 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Applicable Standard 
Courts that have addressed the issue of whether the EP A can 
recover its oversight expenses pursuant to CERCLA have begun by 
determining which standard of statutory interpretation to apply when 
161. Dupont,432F.3datI74-76. 
162. Id. at 175. 
163. Id. It is questionable whether a provision requiring extra work when a private party 
enters into a settlement actually encourages a private party to settle. 
164. Id. at 176. 
165. Id. at 186-87 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
166. Id. at 187 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
167. /d. (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
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analyzing the issue, which is where this discussion will begin.168 The 
court in Rohm & Haas was the first circuit to apply the clear 
statement standard, enunciated in National Cable, to its analysis of 
governmental recovery of EPA oversight costs under CERCLA. 169 
As this comment has demonstrated, numerous courts declined to 
follow the Third Circuit's reasoning in Rohm & Haas and have 
chosen instead to apply a plain meaning standard. 170 Additionally, 
the Third Circuit's decision in Dupont expressly overruled Rohm & 
Haas, and no other circuit has issued a binding opinion requiring the 
application of National Cable to the issue of governmental recovery 
of EP A oversight costs under CERCLA. 171 
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to conclude that National 
Cable's clear statement doctrine applies to the analysis of the present 
issue. Where the issue in National Cable involved the imposition of 
administrative costs by an agency onto regulated entities, the issue of 
the recoverability of EPA oversight costs involves liable parties 
paying for the portion of the harm they caused.172 Liability under 
CERCLA can hardly be described as either a fee or a tax and it is 
more appropriate to refer to it as restitution or compensation. The 
private parties performing a cleanup under CERCLA are responsible 
for a contamination, whereas the entities in National Cable were 
innocent parties paying a fee for the authorization to conduct a 
business. 173 Despite the difference in circumstances, the underlying 
principles of National Cable still offer guidance. The court in 
National Cable expressed concerns over governmental agencies 
recovering their administrative expenses from regulated private 
parties. 174 While there need not be a clear statement of congressional 
intent to shift the burden of government oversight expenses onto 
168. See, e.g., id. at 166; United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1997); At\. 
Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 567 (lOth Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by Dupont, 432 
F.3d 161. 
169. See Atl. Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 567-68. Prior to Rohm & Haas, the only decision 
addressing the issue of whether CERCLA provides for governmental recovery of 
government oversight costs was New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d 
Cir. 1985). Id. at 568. 
170. See, e.g., Lowe, 118 F.3d at 401; Atl. Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 568; Cal. Dep't of 
Toxic Substances Control v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 876 F. Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Cal. 
1994). 
171. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 162-63, 166. 
172. Lowe, 118F.3dat401. 
173. Id. 
174. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 181 (2005) (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
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private parties, the courts should not follow a tortured interpretation 
of CERCLA in order to reach a conclusion they support. 175 The 
inquiry should focus on what the provisions of the CERCLA statute 
actually provide and not what courts believe they should provide. 176 
B. Relevant Provisions 
1. Removal Actions 
A good starting point for an inquiry into the relevant provision of 
CERCLA that affects the recovery of EPA oversight costs is 
CERCLA's definition of the term removal. If there is any part of the 
definition of removal that authorizes recovery of EPA oversight 
costs, it is in the following words: "[S]uch actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of 
release of hazardous substances.,,177 As this comment has previously 
discussed, the decisions that address the issue of governmental 
recovery of EPA oversight costs tend to focus on these words. 178 Of 
the courts that have addressed the issue, most focused specifically on 
the word "monitor," and many used a thesaurus to find synonyms for 
monitor. 179 Of the synonyms, the courts tend to emphasize one, 
"oversee.,,180 While a synonym may be helpful in interpreting a term, 
relying too heavily on the synonym can lead to a construction of 
CERCLA section 107 that is more liberally in favor of the federal 
government than Congress intended. 181 As this comment has 
indicated, the first court to use these synonyms was the Fifth Circuit 
in Atlantic. 182 While the use of a thesaurus may be helpful, there are 
limitations. When a thesaurus produces synonyms such as control 
and regulate, that list of synonyms is unreliable because it includes 
terms that are outside the scope of CERCLA, and cannot possibly 
mean what Congress intended when it included the term monitor in 
CERCLA's definition of removal. 183 Applying these synonyms to the 
analysis of the applicable standard, it is highly unlikely that a court 
would find National Cable applicable because CERCLA permits the 
EP A to monitor or regulate the cleanup. 
175. See id. at 188 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
176. !d. at 182 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
177. 42 U.S.c. § 9601(23) (2006). 
178. See discussion supra Part I1I.B. 
179. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1997). 
180. See id.; Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 569 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
181. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 183 (Rendell, 1., dissenting). 
182. See, e.g., Lowe, 118 F.3d at 403. 
183. See id. 
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A more appropriate reading of the term monitor would be that it 
refers to actual testing and studying of the release or the threat of 
release of hazardous substances at a contaminated site, and not 
oversight of that activity. Numerous courts have interpreted the 
phrase "monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release 
of hazardous substances" to mean initial investigations into the scope 
of the release. 184 The language following the word monitor leads to 
the conclusion that the term is only meant to refer to the release and 
not to EPA oversight of a private-party cleanup. 185 Had Congress 
intended this language to authorize recovery by the federal 
government of EP A oversight costs, it would have used language that 
was not as specific to investigating the release. This language in the 
phrase does not aim to permit governmental recovery of EPA 
oversight costs, and to find authorization of such recovery involves 
making a leap from what CERCLA states to what courts believe 
CERCLA probably should have provided. 
In addition to the phrase discussed above, another phrase within the 
definition of removal that is relevant to a discussion of governmental 
recovery of EPA oversight costs is "the taking of such other actions 
as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the 
public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise 
result from a release or threat of release.,,186 This phrase is at times 
overlooked or under-discussed in opinions or parties' arguments 
addressing the issue that is the subject of this comment, presumably 
because the word monitor is synonymous with oversee, and most 
analyses end with monitor. 18? 
While EPA oversight of a private-cleanup action is undoubtedly 
beneficial to public health, welfare, and the environment, it is hard to 
say that it is "necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage ... 
which may otherwise result from a release.,,188 The language here 
184. See, e.g., Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that the 
government had begun to "monitor, assess, and evaluate" the site where it had 
conducted historic research, investigations, and site surveys to determine the exact 
nature of the contamination); Frey v. EPA, 403 F.3d 828,835 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the phrase "monitor, assess, and evaluate" includes investigating water and 
sediment contamination). 
185. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 183-84 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
186. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2006). 
187. See, e.g., Dupont, 432 F.3d at 172-73 (giving a small amount of coverage compared 
to the term, "monitor"); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1276 n.17 
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the EPA's argument would have been stronger if it had 
relied on this catch-all phrase), overruled by Dupont, 432 F.3d 161. 
188. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
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clearly refers to the "release or threat of a release," and not actions 
taken to supervise the work of a private party.189 Like the rest of the 
definition of removal, this phrase is meant to include work done to 
the site in order to address the contamination directly. 190 In fact, the 
only examples of what the term removal includes are actions taken as 
a result of a release, such as security fencing to limit access, 
temporary evacuation, and housing. 191 It is clear that removal is only 
concerned with action taken to address the release, and not the 
oversight of another's cleanup or containing the release. 192 
There is one last consideration to discuss when looking at 
CERCLA's definition of removal. As stated within the dissent in 
Dupont, there is an oddity created by asserting that the authorization 
for governmental recovery of EPA oversight costs exists within 
CERCLA's definition of removal while at the same time concluding 
that these costs are recoverable as costs of oversight of a removal 
action. 193 It is unquestioned that these cases involve the EPA's 
oversight of a private-party removal action, so it is peculiar to say 
that EPA oversight is a part of the private party's action that the EPA 
is overseeing. 194 
2. Remediation Actions 
In CERCLA's definition section, the definition of removal is 
followed by the definition of remediation. 195 Naturally, this is 
usually the next provision courts examine when analyzing whether 
the EPA can recover its costs of oversight of a private-party 
cleanup.196 Because removal and remediation actions are both types 
of cleanup efforts, they are defined quite similarly, and this similarity 
is shown in the use of common terms within the two definitions. 197 
Not surprisingly, courts that find authorization for governmental 
recovery of EPA oversight costs, within the definition of removal, 
have a tendency to find that same authorization in the definition of 
remediation. As in the definition of removal, the main focus of the 
courts' analyses in the definition of remediation is the term 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. !d. 
192. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 185 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
193. !d. at 182 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
194. Id. at 182-83 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
195. 42 V.S.c. § 960 1 (23)-(24) (2006). 
196. See, e.g., Dupont, 432 F.3d at 171-72. 
197. See 42 V.S.c. § 9601(23}-(24). 
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monitoring. 198 This comment has already addressed the definition of 
monitoring resulting from a natural reading, and an additional in-
depth discussion is unnecessary.199 It only needs to be reiterated that 
the plain meaning of monitoring within a remediation action is the 
actual studying of the site, not oversight of a private party's cleanup 
actions. 
While the definitions of removal and remediation are similar, there 
are differences, and one difference is relevant to this discussion. As 
explained in Part II.D, the definition of remediation includes "such 
actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement ... and 
any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions 
protect the public health and welfare and the environment.,,200 The 
phrase "at the location of the release,,201 implies that the term 
monitoring is used only to refer to monitoring that is conducted 
geographically at the site. Since the monitoring must take place 
within certain geographical constraints, it follows that the monitoring 
is concerned with the site and the contamination, not the actions of 
some third party. The only monitoring that can be conducted 
exclusively at the site of the contamination is scientific monitoring to 
determine the scope of the release. 202 EP A oversight of a private 
party's cleanup action, on the other hand, is not an action that 
exclusively occurs "at the location of the release."203 While certain 
oversight activities can occur at the site, there are numerous other 
oversight functions that will occur miles from the location of the 
release. 204 If Congress had intended the term monitoring to mean 
EPA oversight, did it only intend for the oversight costs to be 
recoverable as remediation costs when it occurred at the site of the 
release? Under this tortured construction, Congress would have 
created a complicated statutory framework where certain oversight 
costs would be recoverable under CERCLA based entirely on 
geographical considerations. There are complex implications of 
equating EPA oversight with monitoring as it is used within 
CERCLA's definition of remediation. This result is counter to the 
198. See, e.g., Dupont, 432 F.3d at 171-72. 
199. See discussion supra Part IV.B.I. 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
201. Id. 
202. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 172. 
203. See id. at 163. 
204. See 42 V.S.c. § 9601(24). "The term [remedial action] includes the costs of 
permanent relocation of residentsL] ... offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, 
destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances .... " Id. 
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common sense conclusion that CERCLA's use of the term 
monitoring simply refers to actual monitoring of the release, not to a 
third party overseeing another's efforts to remediate a site. 205 
3. Response Costs 
The courts in Atlantic, Lowe, and Dupont read the phrase 
enforcement activities, contained within CERCLA's definition of 
response costs, to include EPA oversight of a private-party cleanup 
action. These courts concluded that enforcement activities include 
EPA oversight because "it does not stretch or distort the meaning of 
the phrase" to reach that conclusion. 206 For these courts, enforcement 
activities include not only actions taken to compel a private party to 
perform a cleanup when a private party fails to perform, but also the 
evaluation by the EPA of a private party's actions in performing the 
requested cleanup action. 207 In the face of the Supreme Court 
construing enforcement activities narrowly, the court in Atlantic 
acknowledged that their reading of the term was liberal, but 
nonetheless concluded that enforcement activities could be read 
broadly enough to support its holding. 208 
While the courts in Atlantic, Lowe, and Dupont interpreted the 
phrase enforcement activities to include EPA oversight of a private-
party cleanup activity, many other courts conclude that this term 
primarily, if not entirely, refers to the EPA utilizing a process to 
compel compliance. The court in United States v. Chapman 209 found 
that costs of enforcement activities included reasonable attorney's 
fees where the defendant had failed to perform a cleanup after the 
EPA issued the defendant an order to do So.2lO A decision by the 
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Gurle/ II found that the attorney's 
fees associated with identifying the defendant as a potentially 
responsible party were recoverable as enforcement activities. 212 
Lastly, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Key Tronic Corp. v. United 
205. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 184 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
206. At!. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
207. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 173-74. 
208. Atl. Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 570 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 
809 (1994». 
209. 146 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). 
210. Id. at 1167-69. 
21l. 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994). 
212. Id. at 1200. 
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States,213 found that "the costs of 'enforcement activities' naturally 
(and indeed primarily) include attorney's fees.,,214 
The view that the phrase enforcement activities refers to actions 
taken to compel a private party to comply is buttressed by the House 
Committee Report on SARA amending response costs to include 
enforcement activities. According to the Report, the modification 
"will confirm the EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement 
actions taken against responsible parties.,,215 The word against 
implies that enforcement activities include only those actions that are 
adverse to the interests of the private party performing the cleanup 
action. It necessarily follows that costs such as litigation expenses 
and attorney's fees related to forcing a private party to perform a 
cleanup are what Congress intended by amending SARA. EPA 
oversight of a private-party cleanup action, on the other hand, can 
hardly be described as an action taken against a responsible party. 
For the EPA oversight to be effective, the EPA must work with the 
private party in order to ensure that the cleanup protects the public 
welfare and the environment. If the EPA's role in a cleanup action 
degrades as a result of a private party's unsatisfactory cleanup to the 
point of being "enforcement actions taken against [a] responsible 
[party]," then that role can no longer be considered oversight. 216 The 
statutory language of CERCLA does not permit such an 
interpretation. 217 CERCLA section 122, permitting the government 
to enter into a consent agreement, prohibits the government from 
entering into one if the government determines the responsible party 
will not perform the cleanup properly. 218 Indeed, responsible parties 
generally prefer EPA oversight of their cleanup as opposed to a 
government-led removal or remediation action. 219 EPA oversight of a 
private-party cleanup action is certainly not an action that can be 
described as "against [a] responsible part[y].,,220 
213. 511 U.S. 809(1994). 
214. !d. at 823 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
215. Id. at 818 n.IO (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 66-67 (1985». 
216. United States v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing 
recovery of reasonable attorney's fees as response costs because the defendant failed 
"to clean up his property without EPA involvement."). 
217. See United States v. E.!. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 
2005) (discussing the EPA's role of monitoring a clean-up as separate from 
compelling compliance under section 107 ofCERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006». 
218. CERCLA § I 22(a), 42 U.S.c. § 9622(a) (2006). 
219. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 166. 
220. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 n.lO (1994) (citing H.R. REp. 
No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 66-67). 
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The notion that enforcement activities include EPA oversight of a 
private-party cleanup is a textual leap the courts make, not to 
interpret the language of the CERCLA statute as its plain meaning 
indicates, but to read what the courts believe CERCLA should state. 
There must be something more than just a bald conclusion that 
CERCLA's term enforcement activities includes EPA oversight of a 
private-party cleanup because "it does not stretch or distort the 
meaning of the phrase.,,221 To conclude that CERCLA permits the 
recovery by the federal government of the costs of EPA oversight of 
a private-party cleanup action, the court must find that Congress 
intended that interpretation when it amended CERCLA in 1986. 222 A 
more natural reading of enforcement activities would solely include 
actions taken against a private party in order to compel compliance 
with CERCLA. 223 
4. Other Provisions of CERCLA 
An additional area of CERCLA that affects whether the EPA can 
recover its oversight costs of a private-party cleanup action is the 
textual support CERCLA contains elsewhere-what other provisions 
of CERCLA include or omit. Courts addressing this issue recognize 
that a particular section of a complex statute cannot be examined in a 
vacuum, but must be read in context with a consideration of the 
statute as a whole. 224 A good starting point for such an interpretative 
approach is CERCLA section 104, which not only permits the EPA to 
recover its costs of oversight of a private-party cleanup, but requires 
that a private party agree to reimburse the EPA for them as a 
condition to entering into an agreement directing the private party to 
perform the RIIFS. 225 SARA amended this provision of CERCLA in 
order to permit the private party to perform the RIlFS itself. 226 As 
discussed in Part II.B, the RIfFS is a preliminary assessment of the 
contaminated site conducted to determine the best possible means of 
achieving a proper solution. 227 Congress amended this section of 
CERCLA to permit a limited set of circumstances where Congress 
intended the EPA to recover oversight expenses. 228 
221. See Dupont, 432 F.3d at 185 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (quoting At\. Richfield Co. v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (lOth Cir. 1996». 
222. !d. 
223. Id. 
224. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 569. 
225. CERCLA § 104(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(I) (2006). 
226. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 186 (Rendell, 1., dissenting). 
227. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
228. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 186 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
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The RIIFS is a removal action because it is an action taken to 
"monitor, assess and evaluate the release or threat of release of 
hazardous substances.,,229 Because the RIIFS is a removal action, 
there would be no need to amend the language of CERCLA to permit 
the recovery by the federal government of costs incurred by EPA in 
conducting oversight of the RIIFS if Congress already intended to 
authorize governmental recovery for costs of removal actions in 
general. 230 If Congress intended to include EPA oversight within the 
definition of removal, it surely would not have added additional 
authorization in CERCLA section 104 for governmental recovery of 
the costs of a more specific removal action. 
Courts finding authorization for the recovery by the federal 
government of the costs of EPA oversight of private-party cleanup 
actions conclude that the additional provision in CERCLA section 
104 referring to EPA oversight is nonetheless necessary because of 
the extra requirement in section 104 that the responsible party must 
agree in advance to reimburse the EPA for oversight costS.231 While 
this is an additional requirement, it is not necessary in CERCLA 
section 104 if the definition of removal already includes EPA 
oversight of a private party cleanup action. If CERCLA's definition 
of removal already authorizes the EPA to recover oversight expenses, 
then a private party would merely be agreeing under CERCLA 
section 104 to pay in advance the costs for which it is already 
liable. 232 Under this interpretation, it seems odd for Congress to take 
the time to amend a statute in order to achieve the exact same result 
already provided in the statute. 
Rather than accepting the interpretation of the definition of the term 
removal in CERCLA by courts such as Dupont, it seems much more 
likely that Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 to ensure that the 
EPA would recover its expenses from oversight of a private party's 
RIIFS because it could not otherwise recover them under the 
definition of removal. It appears that Congress confined recovery to 
the narrow set of circumstances where the private party agreed in 
advance to pay for EPA oversight of a RIlFS, not of a removal action 
in general. If Congress had intended to authorize the EP A to recover 
all costs of oversight of a removal action, it could have easily done 
so. Instead, Congress chose to amend CERCLA so that a private 
229. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2006); see also 42 U.S.c. § 9604(a)(l)-(2). 
230. Dupont, 432 F.3d at 185-87 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
231. See, e.g., id. at 175. 
232. !d. at 186 (Rendell, 1., dissenting). 
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party would have to agree in advance under CERCLA section 104 to 
pay for EPA's costs only of oversight of the RVFS.233 
In addition to CERCLA section 104, Congress also amended 
CERCLA in 1986, in the SARA amendments, to permit the use of the 
Superfund to pay for costs incurred by the federal government for 
oversight of a private party's cleanup action. 234 Prior to the SARA 
amendment in 1986, CERCLA section 111 simply provided that the 
EP A could use the Superfund to pay for costs that the EPA incurred 
when it conducted a removal or remediation action under section 
104. 235 If, as the courts in Atlantic, Lowe, and Dupont hold, EPA 
oversight is considered a removal or remediation action, there would 
have been no need for Congress to later amend this provision to 
permit the use of the Superfund for oversight of a more specific 
removal action. The construction advanced by these courts implies 
that Congress amended CERCLA to authorize reimbursement from 
the Superfund for expenses that the EPA was already permitted to 
recover under CERCLA. 236 
When construing a statute, it is necessary "to give every word some 
operative effect.,,237 When Congress amends a statute and adds a 
provision, the courts "cannot suppose that [the] change was without a 
distinct purpose on the part of Congress.,,238 The Supreme Court 
recently addressed another section of CERCLA amended by SARA 
in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. 239 The Court in 
Cooper addressed whether a private party PRP who had not been 
sued under CERCLA sections 106 or 107 may seek contribution from 
other PRPs under section 113( f). 240 Because the relevant provision of 
CERCLA section 113(f) provided that a private party may seek 
contribution "during or following any civil action" under sections 
106 or 107, the Court held that the private party may not do so. 241 
The Court noted that "[t]here is no reason why Congress would 
bother to specify conditions under which a person may bring a 
contribution claim, and at the same time allow contribution actions 
absent those conditions.,,242 Like the relevant language here, there is 
233. Jd. (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
234. Jd. at 187 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
235. Jd. (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
236. Id. (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
237. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004). 
238. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 475 (1911). 
239. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
240. Id. at 160-61. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 166. 
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no reason why Congress would specify that the Superfund could be 
used to reimburse the EPA for oversight expenses if those expenses 
were already within CERCLA's definition of removal or 
remediation. Just as in Cooper, where Congress in CERCLA has 
listed specific instances where a private party PRP can seek 
contribution from other PRPs,243 the issue here is one where Congress 
included certain actions where the EPA could recover its oversight 
costs yet omitted others. 
A final consideration is the lack of any explicit authorization by 
Congress permitting the EPA to recover expenses resulting from EPA 
oversight of a private-party cleanup in general. The only provisions 
where Congress addressed the recoverability of EPA oversight costs 
were in regards to a limited type of removal action and the use of the 
Superfund. 244 It is notable that Congress made clear references to 
EP A oversight costs in these provisions but not in others. 245 Because 
Congress included these two specific references to governmental 
recovery of EPA oversight costs, it is clear that Congress was aware 
that there would be EPA oversight expenses associated with a 
removal or remediation action. It is also clear that Congress intended 
that these two actions, EPA oversight of a private party cleanup and a 
private party removal or remediation cleanup action, would be two 
separate and distinct events. 246 With respect to the Superfund, 
Congress already permitted its use for removal and remediation 
actions and then added authorization for its use for payment of EPA 
oversight costS.247 Congress would likewise have added authorization 
for governmental recovery of EPA oversight costs from private 
parties if it had intended to do SO.248 The lack of any reference to 
EPA oversight costs in the cost recovery provision evidences 
243. !d. at 162-63. 
244. 42 V.S.c. §§ 9604(a), 9611(c)(8) (2006). 
245. See id. 
246. See id. 
247. /d. § 9611(c)(8). 
248. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004). With respect 
to the requirement that a private party could only bring a contribution claim under 
CERCLA section 113(f), the Court stated, "[I]f[section] 113(f) were read to authorize 
contribution actions at any time, regardless of the existence of a [section] 106 or 
[section] 107(a) civil action, then Congress need not have included the explicit 
'during or following' condition." !d. In Cooper, the Court analyzed what Congress 
explicitly included, which provides helpful guidance here when dealing with what 
Congress explicitly omitted. See id. 
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Congress's intent not to pennit governmental recovery of EPA 
oversight costS.249 
5. General Goals of CERCLA 
The goals of CERCLA, to ensure the prompt cleanup of a 
contaminated site and to impose liability upon those persons 
responsible for the contamination, are considerations that must be 
taken into account in interpreting any of the provisions of 
CERCLA. 250 The first, and arguably most important of the two goals, 
is to give the government the tools it needs to execute an effective 
and prompt response action at a contaminated site. 251 Obviously, 
without a cleanup action there would be no need for recovery of 
removal or remediation expenses because there would be no cleanup 
expenses incurred. The primary thrust of CERCLA, as an 
environmental law, is to protect the public welfare and environment, 
with a secondary objective of forcing those persons responsible for a 
site's contamination to pay for the expense of that protection.252 The 
second objective of CERCLA, then, is subservient to the first. It can 
hardly be expected that the EPA would ignore a contaminated site 
simply because it would be unable to later obtain restitution. For 
example, in the case where the EPA, for a particular contaminated 
site, cannot identify any PRPs that are solvent, it is without question 
that the EPA would remediate the site, notwithstanding being unable 
to subsequently recover its cleanup expenses. When a question arises 
as to which goal is the most important of the two, it naturally follows 
that the goal of protecting the public welfare and environment should 
always take precedence. 
This conclusion brings the discussion back to the narrative that 
began this comment. 253 As the introduction detailed, EPA oversight 
of a private party's cleanup action is not always effective in ensuring 
that a private party perfonns a cleanup in a manner consistent with 
the first goal of CERCLA, even when the responsible party is footing 
249. See United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 187 (2005) 
(Rendell, J., dissenting). 
250. See Aaron Gershonowitz, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.: Who Should Pay 
to Clean Up Inactive Hazardous Waste Sites?, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 119, 
121 (2008). 
251. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. llOO, 1112 n.2 (D. 
Minn. 1982) ("Both the House and Senate Committee Reports express the need for 
prompt action . . . and detail the magnitude of the problems caused by hazardous 
waste disposal in this country."). 
252. See id. at 1112. 
253. See discussion supra Part I. 
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the bill for the EPA oversight. As the introduction alluded, there is 
little accountability for EPA oversight when the only parties to the 
transaction are the EPA and the private party. In most instances, 
when an entity employs a third-party to perform services, it is 
expected that the third-party will act in furtherance of that entity's 
best interests. If a private party is required to pay for EPA oversight 
of the private party's cleanup actions, would the EPA need to act in 
the private party's best interests? The obvious answer to that 
question is no, but it does create an interesting and unusual 
relationship. 
The main problem with a private party paying for EPA oversight 
costs is accountability. When the EPA fails to provide adequate 
supervision of a private party's cleanup actions, will the private party 
object to those oversight costs on the grounds that it is not receiving 
the full value of its contribution? A PRP, under a set of 
circumstances similar to that of Ford's in Ringwood, New Jersey, 
likely would not object to the ineffective oversight of its cleanup by 
the EPA. Presumably, a PRP would be content paying a discounted 
rate for EPA oversight when compared to the amount it would have 
to pay to remediate the site completely. Certainly, it would be 
preferable if the two goals of CERCLA could be accomplished with 
respect to every circumstance. But when the accomplishment of the 
second goal places the first in peril, the need to protect the public 
welfare and environment greatly outweighs the price tag of an 
effective response. 
v. CONCLUSION 
When Congress passed CERCLA in 1980, it envisioned an 
environmental law that could be used to respond to the numerous 
hazardous waste sites in the nation and then recover from those 
persons responsible for the sites' contamination. As a part of this 
process, Congress also contemplated that the EPA would oversee a 
private party's cleanup action. But simply because a private party's 
response action will entail EPA oversight does not mean that the EPA 
oversight actions should be considered part of the response actions. 
The language of CERCLA makes this point clear. It is only through 
a reaching and overly broad construction ofCERCLA's definitions of 
removal, remediation, and response costs that the courts are able to 
find support for their conclusions that the federal government can 
recover under CERCLA EPA's costs incurred in oversight of a 
360 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
private party's response actions. 254 These courts fail to read the 
actual language of CERCLA's definitions to obtain plain meanings of 
those definitions, and instead interpret CERCLA in a manner that the 
courts prefers. 255 The language of CERCLA simply does not 
authorize the federal government to recover the costs the EPA incurs 
when the EPA oversees a private party cleanup under CERCLA. 
Aaron Kellyf 
254. See supra Part IV.B.I-3. 
255. See supra Part IV.B.I-3. 
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